international law by passing them on to a third party, be it another state, a private actor, or an international organization.
A discussion on NSAs in general is beyond the scope of this study, and thus the focus will be on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ('UNHCR') owing to its significant role in the protection of Internally Displaced Persons ('IDPs'). In 2005 the UNHCR was appointed lead role within the 'cluster approach' for overseeing the protection, emergency shelter and camp management of IDPs. Although the increased focus on IDP protection is a welcome step, the UNHCR has expressed some concern at this development:
There can be both positive and negative fall-out of the UNHCR's involvement.
Countries of asylum may be more inclined to maintain their asylum policies if something is done to alleviate the suffering of the internally displaced, reduce their compulsion to seek asylum and create conditions conductive to return. On the other hand, UNHCR's activities for the internally displaced may be (mis)interpreted as obviating the need for international protection and asylum. 7 Put simply, the UNHCR's activities on behalf of IDPs could be undermining the institution of asylum. This study will test the legality of this concern by examining whether, and if so, under which circumstances, internal protection afforded by the UNHCR to IDPs constitutes 'protection' under the Refugee Convention and may thus be used by states as a reason to deny refugee status. In light of the fact that IDPs are the largest group receiving the UNHCR's protection and assistance -as many as 15.5 million at the end of 2012 -there are significant issues at stake in this analysis. 8 In addressing this issue, this study will be formed of two parts. The first part will put forward an interpretation of the term 'protection of that country'. This will be done first, by examining the textual definition of 'that country' and 'protection' as set out in the refugee definition; secondly, by analysing relevant principles of EU law; and thirdly, by outlining how these concepts have been elaborated by relevant jurisprudence on international organizations. The second part of this study will analyse whether the UNHCR's activities on behalf of IDPs engage these principles, and this study will conclude by illustrating the reasons for which the activities of the UNHCR cannot constitute 'protection of that country' for the purposes of precluding the application of the refugee definition.
2. The meaning of 'protection of that country'
Textual interpretation of the refugee definition
Although increased IDP protection is a welcome development, it is unclear whether, and if so, how it will impact refugee protection. As the granting of refugee status is dependent on, inter alia, lack of available protection in the country of origin, one must consider whether protection provided internally to IDPs will be interpreted by states as precluding the application of the refugee definition. According to the Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person who:
… Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and bring outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to return to it. 9 The travaux préparatoires of the refugee definition make no reference to the possibility of 'protection' being provided by an international organization.
10 This is not surprising, considering that at the time of drafting of the Refugee Convention, the general understanding was that states had exclusive control over their territories and NSAs had little or no role to play in international law and international relations. Nonetheless, a contemporary reading of the Refugee Convention may lead to a different result.
The starting point for any exercise in treaty interpretation is article 31(1) of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 ('VCLT'):
9 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 137, art 1A. 10 Article 1D of the Refugee Convention does however refer to the provision of protection by international organizations other than the UNHCR. This provision is directed at the provision of protection by UNRWA to Palestinian refugees, rather than being of general applicability.
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
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This rule contains separate principles which must be applied together in order to close in on the true meaning of a phrase in a treaty. 12 By applying this rule, the following paragraphs will examine the two possible angles by which protection by the UNHCR may be relevant to the refugee definition, namely in the interpretation of the phrase 'that country', and; (ii) in the interpretation of the phrase 'protection'.
'That country'
2.1.1.1 '…in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty…'
In order to determine the meaning of 'that country', primary recourse must be had to the ordinary meaning of the term. The difficulty with this approach is that the term 'that country' has various meanings. If 'country' is synonymous with the concept of 'state', then only the authorities of the state can provide protection for the purposes of precluding application of the refugee definition. If, on the other hand, 'country' is to be understood in its geographical sense, protection provided by NSAs could potentially satisfy this requirement. One must therefore look to the other components of article 31(1) of the VCLT to discover the true meaning of 'that country.'
'…in their context…'
Numerous arguments have been put forward in favouring a geographical interpretation of the term 'that country'. First, in the broader context of the treaty as a whole, various provisions explicitly refer to the 'authorities of the country' where the role of the state is concerned.
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According to this argument, the employment of 'that country' in the refugee definition therefore implies that the actor of protection need not exclusively be the authorities of the Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.
14 Thirdly, the wording of the Refugee Convention may be contrasted to that of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 1984 ('CAT'), which specifies that the ill-treatment in question must be attributable to the state in order to engage the state's responsibility under the CAT.
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The arguments supporting the former interpretation of the term 'that country', however, are more convincing. Since 'that country' forms part of a phrase, that is, the refugee definition, that phrase is the obvious initial contextual assessment that must be made. In the context of the refugee definition, 'that country' refers to the earlier term 'country of nationality' which implies that protection can only be granted by an entity which is capable of granting nationality, that is, a state.
16
An examination of the broader contextual picture leads to the same result, as evidence for interpreting 'that country' as the state may be found elsewhere in the Refugee Convention. First, the cessation clauses also speak of re-availment of the protection of the country of nationality.
17
Secondly, the Refugee Convention's accountability mechanisms and the obligations set out in articles 2-33, are specifically addressed to 'states'. 18 According to Mathew, Hathaway and Foster, the very structure of the Refugee Convention arguably requires that protection will be by a government which may be held accountable under international law for its actions, and not by some legally unaccountable entity with de facto control.
19
Thirdly, the 'article 1D' argument outlined above is quite weak. This argument maintains that because article 1D refers to the possibility of protection being provided by an international organization, such a meaning may be inferred to the term 'that county' in the refugee definition. This argument may be turned on its head by stating that the reference to protection provided by an international organization in article 1D excludes this possibility from other provisions of the Refugee Convention.
Fourthly, the Refugee Convention uses the term 'territory' where referring to a geographic area. This terminology appears in 19 of the Convention's 46 articles 20 and is thus strong evidence in favour of the argument that the terminology 'protection within the territory of that country' would have been used if the term 'that state' were to be interpreted in its geographic sense.
21
Fifthly, the meaning of the word 'protection' as used in the refugee definition informs the interpretation of the term 'that country'. At the time the Refugee Convention was concluded, the term 'protection' in the refugee definition referred to diplomatic protection rather than protection within the refugee's country of origin, in the sense that a refugee, being outside the country of his nationality, was unable to avail of his country's protection abroad.
22
Diplomatic protection can only be provided by a state, which further supports the fact that 'that country' refers to protection provided by a state.
In line of the arguments outlined above, this study strongly supports interpreting 'that country' as the state. Although domestic courts have accepted that NSAs may be a source of persecution where the state is unable or unwilling to provide protection, the same cannot be said for the source of protection from the persecution feared. The refugee definition does not refer to whom or what may qualify as an actor of persecution. In contrast, the refugee definition does make reference to the source of protection, that is, a 'country'. Accordingly, the range of possible actors of protection needs to be interpreted more strictly than possible actors of persecution.
'…in light of its object and purpose.'
Further support for this position may be found by examining the meaning of 'that country' in light of the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention. The obligation to interpret a treaty in good faith is set out in article 31 of the VCLT and has been said to be an extension of the obligation to interpret a treaty 'in light of its object and purpose.' It is submitted that the good faith interpretative principle can be applied in the context of this study in two respects. First, as outlined above, the term 'protection of that country' refers to protection provided by the authorities of the country of origin, thus to exclude protection provided by international organizations as constituting 'protection of that country' is in conformity with the text and represents a good faith interpretation of the treaty.
Secondly, as the primary aim of the Refugee Convention is to further the protection of refugees, actions carried out which defeat the aim of refugee protection cannot be said to be performed in good faith. On a cynical view, any state which cites the availability of protection by international organizations -without inquiring as to its effectiveness -as a basis for turning away refugee applicants would seem to be stretching the refugee definition beyond its parameters in order to have further excuse to limit the category of those eligible for international protection. This would fall foul of the requirement to interpret the Refugee Convention in good faith, and thus would represent an incorrect interpretation of the treaty.
Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
This study has argued that 'protection of that country' in the refugee definition is to be interpreted as protection by the authorities of that country, rather than protection provided on the territory of that country. There is one final means by which the latter interpretation may be valid, however. Article 31(4) of the VCLT provides that 'a special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.' Did the parties to the Refugee Convention intend that a 'special meaning' be given to the term 'that country', so that it is to be interpreted in its broader geographical sense? In international body, and it is their interpretation that will decide the fate of the individual asylum-seeker. 24 In the words of Leo Gross:
[We] may never know, or, in some cases, we may not know for a time, which autointerpretation was correct ... This is, for better or worse, the situation resulting from the organizational insufficiency of international law.
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Generally speaking, therefore, a domestic court will have the last word on the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, and this may very well be that protection provided by an international organization may preclude refugee status. Thus while this study supports a more restricted meaning of the term 'that country', it is accepted that this presumption may be displaceable. Therefore, the jurisprudence of domestic courts which supports a contrary interpretation will be considered below.
The concept of 'protection'
So far, this study has argued that the term 'that country' as set out in the refugee definition, refers to the authorities of the state. However, two caveats must be borne in mind: provide protection which would satisfy that envisaged by the Refugee Convention, as the level of protection required will vary in each individual case according to the nature of the persecution feared. It is tentatively suggested, however, that respect for the rule of law, as set out in the Qualification Directive and by the House of Lords, is a good indication of whether the protection from persecution is actually effective.
EU asylum law
The term 'actors of protection' has also woven its way into EU asylum law, purportedly in response to international developments in peacekeeping. 29 Of relevance to this study are the measures adopted in the area of minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third countries as refugees. Another objection lies with the requirement that the actor of protection takes 'reasonable steps' to prevent the persecution. Although this is a requirement of conduct, which merely obliges a state to do all in its power to achieve a result, rather than to actually achieve that result, 48 it could nevertheless be argued that article 7(2) which outlines that protection incorporates operating an 'effective legal system' sets a required standard of protection. 
Jurisprudence

Introduction
There is limited jurisprudence on the role of international organizations as actors of protection, most of which stems from England and Wales and deals with protection provided by international organizations in Kosovo. Nonetheless, the following paragraphs will engage in an examination of the case-law which sheds light on this issue, with particular reference to whether the jurisprudence may be applicable to UNHCR's IDP operations. Although these cases found that UNMIK and KFOR could constitute actors of protection for the purposes of the Refugee Convention, it should be noted that these cases were decided prior to the introduction of the 2011 recast Qualification Directive, which specifies that such protection 56 Dyson J accepted the submission that the agent of protection did not have to be the body which grants nationality, holding that 'the phrase "protection of that country" is capable of including protection by the authorities that have the duty to provide protection in that country.'
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In both of the above cases, it was held that the source of protection was irrelevant. The Court in Vallaj affirmed the opinion of Professor Christopher Greenwood:
... if the protection which a person is entitled to expect is in fact being provided by a United Nations administration in the territory from which that person comes, it would be unduly formalistic and contrary to common sense to hold that, since the United Nations is not a country, that person is not able to obtain protection. The 'living instrument' approach should therefore only be employed where its resulting interpretation does not conflict with the general rule of interpretation in the VCLT, namely the obligation set out in Article 31 to interpret a treaty 'in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.' 62 As outlined in part 2 of this study, an application of Article 31 to the Refugee Convention leads to the conclusion that the term 'that country' refers to the authorities of the state. The conclusion reached in Vallaj that UNMIK and KFOR were capable of constituting protection of that country therefore seems to be at odds with Article 31 of the VCLT and thus represents an incorrect interpretation of the Refugee Convention. Nonetheless, for the sake of argument, the conclusion reached in Vallaj will be applied in part 3 of this study to the UNHCR's activities with IDPs owing to the fact that, as discussed above, in the absence of an international monitoring body, it is inevitably a domestic court that will have the last word on question of interpretation of the Refugee Convention and therefore the conclusion in Vallaj is highly relevant to this study.
The third principle to emerge from this jurisprudence is the relevance of consent. In The fourth principle to emerge from this jurisprudence is that the relevant entity must have assumed the international obligation to protect. In Vallaj it was held that UNMIK had accepted the protection obligation as set out in the Refugee Convention, and that such obligations had been tasked to it because such protection was not available by the host state. 66 This was later affirmed in Gardi. 67 The final issue raised by this jurisprudence is whether the question of whether the entity does, as a matter of fact, provide protection against persecution in Kosovo, and for this purpose it is irrelevant whether the FRY has granted consent, or that UNMIK is vested with the international law obligation to provide such protection. 68 This argument relied on the decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal in Dyli 69 (outlined above), which held that the means by which protection is received, whether directly by the authorities of the state, or by another entity, is irrelevant for the purposes of the refugee definition. Although Dyson J preferred the appellant's first submission, he accepted the compelling nature of the third. 70 In his words:
The surrogacy principle is engaged when there has been a failure in the basic duty of protection owed to the nationals of a state. The duty of protection is owed by the country of nationality, unless it is transferred, as a matter of international law, to another entity. In these circumstances, it seems to me that the better analysis is that "protection of that country" refers to the protection by the entity that is charged with the duty of protection, and that, on the true construction of article 1A(2), a person may have a well-founded fear of persecution only if there has been a failure to protect by that entity or its agent.
71 since the 1960s. According to the UNHCR, it has an interest in protecting all those who, had they crossed an international border, would have had a claim to international protection. This interest arises because of the similarity between such internally displaced persons and refugees, the causes and consequences of their displacement, and their humanitarian needs.
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The new 'Cluster Approach' was not in itself a mandate-giving mechanism, but a more clearly spelled-out role, based on the notion that governments have the primary role for protection of their citizens. 75 It is an arrangement through which the existing mandates of international organizations are brought together in a coordinated and predictable fashion.
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Thus although it may seem that the UNHCR is being given a new responsibility under the cluster approach, in reality it is merely operating under its existing mandate of protecting
IDPs. The most significant change of the new cluster approach, however, is the allocation of responsibility of protection to the UNHCR, which is the biggest gap in the safeguarding of IDPs. More generally, the UNHCR now has a much larger involvement with IDPs in the past, when it only intervened on a case-by-case basis.
Application of jurisprudence to UNHCR's protection activities for IDPs
The jurisprudence outlined in this study has created a number of general principles regarding NSAs as agents of protection which may be applied by analogy to the activities of the UNHCR in protecting IDPs. Although UNMIK and KFOR were held to qualify as actors of protection, it should be mentioned that the human rights record of both UNMIK and KFOR has been subject to significant criticism.
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The effectiveness of UNMIK and KFOR's protection is therefore highly questionable, resulting in a dangerous precedent being set by the House of Lords. In addition, this case raises the broader issue of the responsibility of international organizations for human rights violations, and the idea that effective protection cannot be provided by an entity which cannot be held accountable for violations of international law. protection can be provided by a UN agency or body, it would it would be unduly formalistic and contrary to common sense to state that because the UN is not a country, refugee status should be recognised.
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The second factor that influences the interpretation of this term is the fact that there exists jurisprudence to the effect that the Refugee Convention is to be interpreted as a living instrument, and its interpretation is therefore influenced by recent developments. In Vallaj,
the Court accepted that since the 1990s, the UN Security Council had shown an increased willingness to become involved in the affairs of states and that consequently the presence and protection by the UN within a country of origin could constitute protection for the purposes of the refugee definition. 80 As submitted above, this decision represented an incorrect interpretation of the Refugee Convention, in the sense that it privileged the 'living instrument' approach over the general rule of treaty interpretation enshrined in Article 31 of the VCLT. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to consider whether the Vallaj conclusion could be applied by analogy to UNHCR's activities with IDPs. As outlined in part 3 of this study, the UNHCR has taken the lead role in the protection, camp management and emergency shelter of IDPs since 2005 and thus the protection of IDPs is no longer solely a matter of internal affairs. Thus a 'living instrument' interpretation of the term 'protection of that country' may in fact allow for UNHCR in-country protection to constitute same. In addition, it may be argued that protection by the UNHCR would negate the 'well-founded fear' aspect of the refugee definition, so that even if protection of that country is read in its narrow sense, protection by the UNHCR would still preclude satisfaction of the refugee definition.
In deciding whether protection provided by an international organization is 'protection' for the purposes of the Refugee Convention, the two-pronged approach organization is capable in law of providing such protection? Secondly, is the international organization capable in fact of providing such protection? It was argued that it was irrelevant whether the international organization in question had the obligation to protect under international law, provided that such protection was in fact being provided. This argument was not rejected by the Court, and thus this study will consider such a possibility.
3.2.1 Is the UNHCR capable in law of providing such protection?
In answering the first question, the above jurisprudence has revealed numerous criteria which must be satisfied before an international organization may be considered in law an actor of protection for the purposes of precluding application of the refugee definition. It must be highlighted, however, that, all of the aforementioned cases are from the United Kingdom and thus while a useful indication of how the Refugee Convention may be interpreted, the practice of one state does not international law make. Similarly, the Qualification Directive applies to EU member states only, and without, inter alia, supporting state practice, it cannot be stated to represent customary international law or an authoritative interpretation of the Refugee Convention.
According to the above jurisprudence and analysis, UNMIK constituted an agent of protection because all the relevant powers and functions of the state had been transferred to an international body, and that body had assumed the international obligation to protect nationals of the state. The worrying conclusion of these decisions is that, in theory, it is possible for a state to arrange for another body to take over all of its duties, including the protection of human rights. Although the relevance of the FRY's consent to UNMIK's activities was not definitely addressed by the Court, this possible criterion will also be examined by this study. 81 Finally, it should be noted that the recast Qualification Directive stipulates that the actor of protection should have control of the state or a substantial part of the territory of the state.
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The above principles may be applied to the UNHCR in the form of the following As argued above, the standard of protection required is inextricably linked to the nature of persecution feared. Thus it is not possible to set out definitively the standard of protection necessary to preclude the granting of refugee status. Nonetheless, as the jurisprudence shows, the operation of effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of persecutory acts is a good indication of effective protection, and such protection must be nontemporary in nature. Is such protection being provided by the UNHCR?
3.2.2.1 Is the UNHCR operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of persecutory acts, and is such protection accessible?
'Protection' in the sense of UNHCR's activities, has not been defined in its statute.
Nonetheless, the UNHCR has articulated that 'the challenge of international protection is to secure admission, asylum, and respect by states for basic human rights, including the principle of non-refoulement.' 94 This also encompasses ensuring the 'physical safety and security' of refugees.
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This concept of protection does not encompass operating a legal system. The operation of a legal system requires the establishment of; inter alia, a legislative system, a police force, a court system, and detention facilities, all of which require powers and functions which are generally attributable to states. The UNHCR is not endowed with such powers and as such, does not have the capacity to operate such a system. The UNHCR's role in this respect only extends to assisting the authorities to develop national legislation and appropriate administrative support arrangements, so as to strengthen the IDP protection framework. 96 In Afghanistan, for example, the UNHCR will be supporting the implementation of the national IDP policy in 2014, 97 and in Somalia it will provide knowledge and technical support in order to enhance the capacity of the newly-constituted mandate, which has the broader duty to provide an interim administration, to maintain civil law and order, and to protect and promote human rights. Thus the protection activities carried out by UNHCR do not indicate a standard of protection which may, in certain circumstances, preclude the granting of refugee status.
Is the UNHCR's protection non-temporary in nature?
The UNHCR recognises that '[it] can only play a limited role in addressing the issue of internal displacement.' 99 UNHCR's role with IDPs in any given situation is of a transient nature, with the long-term aim being that states themselves will be able to effectively address displacement challenges. Consequently, UNHCR's protection of IDPs is not of a 'nontemporary nature', and therefore would not come within the definition of 'actors of protection' as set out in the recast Qualification Directive.
3.2.2.3 Even if not the body with the legal duty to provide protection, can the UNHCR be considered an actor of protection if it is in fact providing protection?
It is submitted that this third possibility, as raised in Vallaj, is inapplicable to UNHCR's activities with IDPs as the discussion above indicates that UNHCR is not in fact providing protection to an extent which would preclude the application of the refugee definition.
Conclusion
The question that this study set out to answer was whether, in providing protection to IDPs, the UNHCR could be classified as an 'actor of protection' and thus where UNHCR protection is available in the country of origin, refugee status could be denied to persons seeking asylum abroad. As outlined above, there are numerous possibilities by which the activities of the UNHCR may be linked to the refugee definition, and thus in the first instance there is a very real possibility that activities by the UNHCR could be in conflict with the institution of asylum.
Nonetheless, in considering the refugee definition in its context, and in line with the obligation to interpret a treaty in good faith to achieve its object and purpose, this study has argued that 'that country' cannot be interpreted as anything but the authorities of the state. 99 UNHCR, above n 85, para 20.
The UNHCR therefore cannot in law be considered an actor of protection for the purposes of precluding the application of the refugee definition. Nonetheless, there exists jurisprudence supporting a contrary approach. In addition, the interpretation of 'that country' as argued by this study is not incompatible with a situation in which an international organization could be acting formally in place of the state, in particular with Security Council authorization.
This analysis in this study reveals that even if the term 'that country' is interpreted in a manner that would allow for protection to be provided by a NSA, the UNHCR is lacking certain traits that are essential for it to be considered an actor of protection in this respect.
Where UNHCR provides in-country protection, the obligation to protect its nationals is not, as a matter of international law, transferred to the UNHCR and the UNHCR is not endowed with the powers and attributes of the state. In addition, the UNHCR is not in control of the state or a substantial part of the territory of the state. Put simply, the UNHCR is not capable in law as constituting an actor of protection which would preclude the application of the refugee definition.
The second question asks whether the UNHCR is capable, in fact, of providing such protection. As outlined above, it is impossible to give a definitive exposition as to the standard of protection required by the refugee definition. This is because the standard of protection required is dependent on the nature of the persecution feared. Nonetheless, the operation of a legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of persecutory acts is a good indication of whether protection is effective. The UNHCR does not have the capacity or legal authority to operate such a system. Furthermore, UNHCR's protection efforts are of a transient nature, designed to capacitate states in finding a long-term solution to the IDP problem.
It may be concluded therefore that the activities of the UNHCR on behalf of IDPs will not constitute 'protection of that state' so as to preclude the application of the refugee definition, and it is therefore not in conflict with the institution of asylum under international law.
